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Abstract: This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman’s recent paper,
“The two Bell’s theorems of John Bell”. Wiseman argues that, in 1964,
Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions
and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known
as) “parameter independence”. Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according
to Wiseman, first establish a conflict between the quantum mechanical
predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would sometimes
call “local causality”). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing
disagreements about what, exactly, Bell’s theorem does and does not prove
can be understood largely as miscommunications resulting from the fact that
there are really two quite distinct “Bell’s theorems”. My goal here is to lay
out what Wiseman briefly describes as an “alternate reading” of Bell’s 1964
paper, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) “the first paragraph of
Bell’s ‘Formulation’ section [should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964
theorem, the first part of a two-part argument.” I will argue in particular that
this “alternate reading” is the correct way to understand Bell’s 1964 paper and
that Wiseman’s reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.
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1. Introduction
My goal here will be to summarize and record my side of a debate that has erupted in
response to Howard Wiseman’s recent paper on “The two Bell’s theorems of John Bell”
[1]. The debate concerns the question (much in the air as we celebrate the 50th anniversary
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of Bell’s 1964 theorem) of what, exactly, Bell did and didn’t prove in 1964 [2]. My view,
which seems to match that of Bell himself as well as several other contributors to this
forum (including for example Tim Maudlin and Jean Bricmont)1, is that already in 1964
Bell demonstrated the need for non-locality in any theory able to reproduce the standard
quantum predictions. (“Non-locality” here means a violation of a generalized prohibition
on faster-than-light causal influences.) Whereas the opposing view (which is probably a
majority view among normal physicists who have not studied Bell’s work carefully, and
is especially prominent among those physicists Wiseman describes as “operationalists”) is
that Bell only established a conflict between the empirical predictions of quantum theory
and the joint assumptions of locality and determinism.
Those adopting the opposing view tend to retain allegiance to locality (which, they
suggest, is after all a requirement of relativity) and insist that the upshot of Bell’s
work is that determinism must be abandoned. That is, they regard Bell’s theorem as
fundamentally a no-hidden-variables proof and hence a vindication of some standard
(orthodox/Copenhagen/operationalist) interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is in
contrast to Bell’s own view, according to which the conflict with experiment cannot be
blamed on determinism or any other departure from orthodoxy, but instead establishes that,
however strongly motivated it might be by relativity theory, locality is false.
Wiseman’s view, expressed in his recent paper, is neither of the above. Instead,
his view is that both sides are right – because they are talking about different things.
In particular, according to Wiseman, the theorem in Bell’s 1964 paper shows exactly
what the operationalists claim: reproducing the quantum mechanical predictions requires
abandoning either locality or deterministic hidden variables. Whereas, again according
to Wiseman, Bell would later (in 1976) prove a second theorem establishing a conflict
between the quantum mechanical predictions and a unitary notion of “local causality”
that captures the prohibition on faster-than-light causal influences for general (stochastic,
i.e., not necessarily deterministic) theories. So (according to Wiseman) Bell, Maudlin,
Bricmont, myself, and others are correct to say that “Bell’s theorem proves non-locality”
– if by “non-locality” we mean a failure of Bell’s “local causality” condition – while
simultaneously those taking the opposing view are right to say that “Bell’s theorem proves
only that deterministic hidden-variable theories have to be non-local.” We’re both right; we
just mean different things by “Bell’s theorem”. It was simple miscommunication all along.
But I simply don’t think that’s right. The truth, I think, is that the people taking the
opposing view have simply missed, or misunderstood, the role of the EPR argument in
Bell’s 1964 paper.2 And Wiseman, in constructing an interpretation of that paper according
1 See John Bell Workshop 2014, http://www.ijqf.org/groups-2/bells-theorem/forum/.
2 Or they have refused, on some kind of anti-realist philosophical grounds, to even entertain as meaningful
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to which the opposing view is correct (even if only in regard to that paper) essentially just
repeats this common misunderstanding.
There is a lot going on in Wiseman’s paper and hence a lot that a full analysis of it
would need to go into. Providing such an analysis is not my goal here. Instead I will
focus exclusively on the question of what, exactly, Bell wrote and meant and did in his
1964 paper. It will turn out that much of what is under dispute here hinges on exactly
what Bell meant by the word “locality” and, in particular, on whether his several comments
about “locality” should be understood as attempts to provide a generalized definition of
this term (Wiseman’s view), or instead (my view) merely as descriptions of a narrower
implication of locality in the context of the particular type of theory that Bell took to have
been previously shown, by Einstein et al., to be required by a more generalized notion
of locality. Fittingly, the dispute also involves a disagreement about how to understand
Bell’s intentions with regard to his repeated citation of a certain passage from Einstein’s
“Autobiographical Notes” [3].
In the following section I review Wiseman’s reading of the 1964 paper and then present,
in the subsequent section, an overview of my own reading. A final section then elaborates
on the several problems I see in Wiseman’s interpretation and summarizes the issues as I
see them. There is a lot of quoting from Bell, Wiseman, and Einstein. So to make reading
this essay as easy as possible I have color-coded the quotations from these three sources:
Bell (1964) in blue, Wiseman (2014) in red, and Einstein (1949) in green. Quotations from
other sources are cited in the usual way.
2. Wiseman’s Reading of Bell’s 1964 Paper
Wiseman describes Bell’s 1964 theorem as showing “that there are quantum predictions
incompatible with any theory satisfying locality and determinism” and emphasizes that
“Bell’s 1964 theorem suggests that Bell experiments leave us with a choice: accept
that physical phenomena violate determinism, or accept that they violate locality.” As
Wiseman acknowledges, this reading puts him in the “almost universal” category of
misunderstanding that Bell himself would later call attention to:
“My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of
the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But
the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with
deterministic hidden variables.” [4]
Nevertheless, Wiseman insists that his reading of the 1964 paper (contrary to Bell’s own
later description of what he had done there) is correct. How does he justify this reading?
the issues that Einstein et al. – and Bell – raised.
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Wiseman begins by quoting Bell’s several statements involving “locality” in the 1964
paper. The first relevant passage occurs in “1 Introduction” (which Wiseman and I agree is
really more like an abstract):
“The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen was advanced as an argument
that quantum mechanics could not be a complete theory but should be
supplemented by additional variables. These additional variables were to
restore to the theory causality and locality[∗]. In this note that idea will be
formulated mathematically and shown to be incompatible with the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics. It is the requirement of locality, or more
precisely that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by
operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past, that
creates the essential difficulty.”
Bell’s footnote references the following excerpt from Einstein’s “Autobiographical Notes”
in the 1949 Schilpp volume: “But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely
hold fast: the real factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with the
system S1, which is spatially separated from the former.”
Wiseman proceeds to assume “that the ‘real factual situation’ of a system is what is
probed by measuring it” and notes that “the notions of being ‘independent of what is
done with’ or ‘unaffected by operations on’ a system clearly refer to the action of an
agent (say Alice) on her system, and mean that Alice’s action has no statistical effect.”
It is not completely clear what, exactly, Wiseman takes the relationship to be, between
Bell’s own words here and the words he quotes from Einstein. (This will be discussed
extensively later.) But Wiseman does seem to allow his interpretation of Einstein’s words to
influence his interpretation of Bell’s words, and he does acknowledge that “Bell’s definition
of locality follows from the supposition of Einstein’s which [Bell] quotes.” In any case, all
of this leads Wiseman to formalize Bell’s definition of locality as:
Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|b, c, λ) (1)
which is the same condition that is usually referred to as “parameter independence” (PI) in
the more recent Bell literature.3
Wiseman also quotes Bell’s summary statement, from the Conclusion of his 1964 paper:
3 The “θ” subscripts in the formula refer to the particular candidate theory assigning the probabilities in
question. Note also that the formula remains somewhat vague until one specifies exactly what each symbol
– and in particular the notoriously controversial λ – is meant to capture. Wiseman is not explicit about
this, but seems to follow Bell in understanding the λ (together with c) as denoting a complete specification
of the physical state of the particle pair at some appropriate time prior to any measurement. But this is
also slightly puzzling since Wiseman also seems to think that “[f]or the operationalist, locality [i.e., PI]
is a natural assumption...” In my opinion, any genuine “operationalist” would simply balk at a notion of
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“In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to determine
the results of individual measurements, without changing the statistical
predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measuring
device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote.”
Wiseman italicizes the phrase “the setting of one measuring device can influence the
reading of another instrument, however remote” and explains that he regards this as
constituting a formulation of “(the negation of) locality”. Wiseman writes:
“As the above quote shows, Bell definitely means locality specifically as the
absence of any influence of the setting a on the remote measurement device.
This confirms my above reading of his definition of locality in [equation (1)
above]. In fact, this reading is confirmed in two more places in the paper.”
The two other places cited by Wiseman include the first paragraph of Bell’s “2
Formulation” where Bell writes:
“Now we make the hypothesis[∗], and it seems one at least worth considering,
that if the two measurements are made at places remote from one another the
orientation of one magnet does not influence the result obtained with the other.”
(Note that Bell again here cites the same passage from Einstein’s “Autobiographical Notes”
that was quoted earlier.) The other passage that Wiseman regards as confirming his
interpretation of what Bell means by “locality” comes later in Bell’s section 2:
“The vital assumption[∗] is that the result B for particle 2 does not depend on
the setting a of the magnet for particle 1, nor A on b.”
(Note that Bell here cites Einstein for a third time.)
Having thus laid out his evidence for interpreting Bell as having meant, by “locality” in
1964, our Equation (1) above, Wiseman turns his attention to Bell’s recapitulation, in “2
Formulation”, of the EPR argument. Wiseman quotes Bell’s one-sentence summary of the
argument
“Since we can predict in advance the result of measuring any chosen
component of ~σ2 by previously measuring the same component of ~σ1,
locality that required (to use Bell’s later characterization) comparing probabilities conditioned on “a full
specification of local beables in a [certain] space-time region”. [5] Thus I think to some extent Wiseman
conflates PI with a (distinct, and genuinely operationally meaningful) “no signaling” condition. (See Ref.
[6] for some further relevant discussion.) And I think this conflation is based to some extent on forgetting
the θ subscripts in Equation (1), i.e., thinking that the probabilities this formula relates can be understood
as empirical frequencies. (Notice for example Wiseman’s use of the phrase “statistical effect”.) But, having
noted it here, I will ignore this side issue in the remainder of this paper.
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it follows that the result of any such measurement must actually be
predetermined.”
and then remarks:
“Here Bell has made a mistake. His conclusion (predetermined results) does
not follow from his premises (predictability, and [PI]). This is simple to see
from the following counter-example. Orthodox quantum mechanics (OQM) is
a theory in which the setting a of one device does not statistically influence the
result B obtained with the other:
Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|b, c, λ)
Here, if c were to correspond to preparation of a mixed quantum state ρc, the
variable λ would allow for a pure-state decomposition; in purely operational
QM, only cwould appear. But in OQM it is of course not true that the results of
spin measurements are predetermined for a singlet state as Bell is considering.”
Wiseman is here pointing out that OQM (which respects PI and is hence “local” in the sense
Wiseman attributes here to Bell) predicts the usual kind of perfect correlations in the EPR
setup, but fails to attribute outcome-determining local hidden-variables to the individual
particles in the EPR pair. Wiseman, that is, regards orthodox quantum mechanics as a
counter-example to the EPR argument – or, at least, the recapitulation of it that Wiseman
interprets Bell as giving here.
And that is basically that. Wiseman closes by asserting (presumably on the grounds that
he considers the argument as presented invalid) that “Bell’s EPR paragraph forms no part
of his 1964 theorem” and remarking as follows on his accusation that Bell made a mistake
in thinking that the EPR argument (“from locality to deterministic hidden variables”) was
valid:
“I would classify Bell’s mistake in this paragraph as a peccadillo, having no
impact on the main result in his paper. It would have been an easy mistake for
Bell to have made, if he had the idea that EPR had already proven determinism
from some sort of locality assumption, and did not think hard about whether
it was the same as the locality assumption he was about to use in his own
theorem. Indeed the paper could be made completely sound by replacing
‘it follows’ in the above (‘Since we can predict...’) quote by ‘the obvious
explanation is’, or ‘EPR’s premises imply’. Although Bell believed that he
was reproducing EPR’s argument, EPR’s premises (which are never stated by
Bell) are not equivalent to locality (as defined here by Bell), and they do justify
the conclusion of pre-determined outcomes...”
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(For a proof that EPR’s premises, including a notion of locality distinct from the one
Wiseman attributes here to Bell, we are sent to an Appendix in Wiseman’s paper.)
3. My Own Reading
Let me here give an overview of my own reading of Bell’s 1964 paper, and then come
back (in the next section) to explain exactly what I find implausible about Wiseman’s
interpretation.
I would begin with something Wiseman seems to barely notice: the title of Bell’s
paper. This, I think, already makes it quite obvious that Bell intends his novel result to
be understood as being built “On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox”. That is, I think,
Bell takes himself (quite correctly) to be adding a crucial second step to what had been
previously established by Einstein et al. This foundational role of the EPR argument in
Bell’s work is made quite clear in the first section, “1 Introduction”, which I quote here in
full:
“The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen was advanced as an argument
that quantum mechanics could not be a complete theory but should be
supplemented by additional variables. These additional variables were to
restore to the theory causality and locality[∗]. In this note that idea will be
formulated mathematically and shown to be incompatible with the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics. It is the requirement of locality, or
more precisely that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected
by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past,
that creates the essential difficulty. There have been attempts to show
that even without such a separability or locality requirement no ‘hidden
variable’ interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible. These attempts have
been examined elsewhere and found wanting. Moreover, a hidden variable
interpretation of elementary quantum theory has been explicitly constructed.
That particular interpretation has indeed a grossly non-local structure. This
is characteristic, according to the result to be proved here, of any such theory
which reproduces exactly the quantum mechanical predictions.”
The second part of the paragraph here tells us something about Bell’s motivation for
undertaking the reported work (namely, he wanted to see if any deterministic completion
of quantum theory would have to have the “grossly non-local structure” displayed by the
de Broglie - Bohm pilot-wave theory).
But let us focus here on the first part, which (like Wiseman) I read as essentially an
abstract of the paper. It begins by noting that, according to the earlier EPR argument,
a hidden-variable type theory could “restore to the theory [i.e., quantum mechanics]
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causality and locality”. This clearly implies that, according to Bell, Einstein et al.
had previously established that ordinary quantum mechanics violates both “causality and
locality”. The violation of causality (which, like Wiseman, I understand here to simply
mean “determinism”) is uncontroversial and unremarkable. But it is important to appreciate
that already here Bell is claiming (and/or endorsing Einstein’s previous claim) that ordinary
quantum mechanics violates “locality”. This is certainly consistent with what we know
of Einstein’s criticisms of quantum mechanics (to be elaborated further in the following
section). In particular, it is consistent with the passage from Einstein that Bell specifically
chose to cite here (and then two subsequent times) as, evidently, capturing his (Bell’s) own
understanding of this concept:
“But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: the
real factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with the
system S1 which is spatially separated from the former.”
In my opinion, what Bell means by “locality” has thus already been made rather clear: he
means some sense of “locality” that (i) is reasonably well-captured by the Einstein passage
from “Autobiographical Notes”, (ii) had been involved in the EPR argument, and (iii) is
violated by ordinary quantum mechanics. (Parameter Independence, of course, satisfies
none of these three criteria.)
But what about the immediately-following sentences of Bell’s “1 Introduction”? Here
Bell writes: “In this note that idea will be formulated mathematically and shown to be
incompatible with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. It is the requirement
of locality, or more precisely that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected
by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past, that creates the
essential difficulty.” First off, what is “that idea” which will be formualted mathematically?
I read Bell here as referring, with “that idea”, back to the conjunction of “causality and
locality” – i.e., the two features that were to be restored by the introduction of additional
variables. This is, after all, precisely what he does later formulate mathematically in the
first equation appearing in his paper. According to this equation, which I reproduce here,
the outcomes are mathematically determined by locally-accessible variables:
A(a, λ) = ±1, B(b, λ) = ±1. (2)
I thus interpret the statement about locality from the abstract (namely, “the result of a
measurement on one system [should] be unaffected by operations on a distant system
with which it has interacted in the past”) not as an attempt to give a general formulation
or definition of locality (he has already done this by quoting Einstein!), but instead as a
description of the specific implication of locality (to deterministic hidden variable theories)
that he will use later in the body of his paper. This seems perfectly natural since the
statement appears in (what amounts to) an abstract of the paper, i.e., in a summary of the
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novel result the paper will announce. Note in particular that the statement in question comes
just after the future-tensed statement about what “will be formulated mathematically”.
Whereas the first two sentences of the abstract refer to the earlier work of EPR – and
Einstein’s earlier formulation of locality – in the past tense.
It is also natural to interpret, in this same way, Bell’s statement from later in the paper,
just after he writes what I have transcribed in equation (2) above:
“The vital assumption is that the result B for particle 2 does not depend on the
setting a, of the magnet for particle 1, nor A on b.”
Here, that is, he is not telling us what “locality” (in the most general sense) means, but
instead calling our attention to a particular feature of the deterministic model he’s just
written down: namely, it is a local deterministic hidden-variable theory. And similarly for
his summarizing sentence in “6 Conclusion”:
“In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to determine
the results of individual measurements, without changing the statistical
predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measuring
device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote.”
Note in particular that the violation of locality (namely, the existence of “a mechanism
whereby the setting of one measuring device can influence the reading of another
instrument, however remote”) is described here as applying specifically to deterministic
hidden variable theories (i.e., theories “in which parameters are added to quantum
mechanics to determine the results of individual measurements”.)
These three statements – that Wiseman interprets as attempts to define “locality” –
thus instead seem to me to be clearly only attempts to describe the specific implication
of locality that Bell uses in the context of the deterministic hidden-variable type theory
that, he argues (citing EPR), is required to restore locality to QM.
Thus, I think the overall structure of Bell’s paper is as follows: first he cites EPR
as having previously established that locality (in Einstein’s sense) requires positing
deterministic hidden variables (in order to explain the predicted perfect correlations);
then, in the main body of the paper, he lays out his new proof that this kind of local
deterministic theory runs afoul of the quantum predictions when more general correlations
are considered. It is crucial here that Bell takes EPR to have previously established the
need for deterministic hidden variables in order to restore locality. Bell is effectively
(and, in retrospect, somewhat naively and unfortunately) taking for granted that his readers
understand that this has already been established, and is thus (quite reasonably) focusing his
expositional attention on the novel result that he has established, building on the foundation
laid by EPR. If we drop this overall context (i.e., ignore the foundational role of EPR and
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assume that Bell is starting from scratch) we are likely to misinterpret much of what he
says, about “locality” in particular.
There is, however, one statement about “locality” in Bell’s paper which is, from my
point of view, somewhat problematic. This occurs in the first pargraph of “2 Formulation”
where Bell is recapitulating the EPR argument (that he would later characterize as an
argument “from locality to deterministic hidden variables”):
“With the example advocated by Bohm and Aharanov, the EPR argument is the
following. Consider a pair of spin one-half particles formed somehow in the
singlet spin state and moving freely in opposite directions. Measurements can
be made, say by Stern-Gerlach magnets, on selected components of the spins
σ1 and σ2. If measurement of the component σ1·a, where a is some unit vector,
yields the value +1 then, according to quantum mechanics, measurement of
σ2 · a must yield the value −1 and vice versa. Now we make the hypothesis[∗],
and it seems one at least worth considering, that if the two measurements are
made at places remote from one another the orientation of one magnet does not
influence the result obtained with the other. Since we can predict in advance
the result of measuring any chosen component of σ2, by previously measuring
the same component of σ1, it follows that the result of any such measurement
must actually be predetermined.”
This is the only point in the paper where Bell is actually attempting to recapitulate the
logic of the EPR argument and hence explain exactly why and how pre-determination
really “follows” from locality and perfect correlations. So it is here that we would most
want and expect to see an explicit general formulation of locality (rather than just some
statement about one of locality’s implications in the specific context of deterministic
theories). And, unfortunately, Bell disappoints us. Other than citing Einstein, what he
says here about locality (“if the two measurements are made at places remote from one
another the orientation of one magnet does not influence the result obtained with the other”)
certainly falls short of a general formulation (along the lines that he would later give, in
1976 and 1990). It should be clear, for example, from the involvement of “magnets” that he
is only here talking about some kind of implication of locality in the specific EPR-Bohm
setup (with spin 1/2 particles whose spins are measured using Stern-Gerlach magnets).
But even leaving that disappointing specificity aside, what Bell says here seems
problematic in another way as well: what does it mean to say that some distant intervention
“does not influence the result obtained” by a nearby measurement? As the following five
decades of Bell literature eloquently illustrate, it is notoriously difficult and controversial
to precisely capture the idea of causal influence in the context of general (not necessarily
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deterministic) theories.4 So it is simply not clear how to translate Bell’s words here (about
locality) into a sharp mathematical statement in terms of which the EPR argument might
be rigorously rehearsed.
So, and especially taking into account the five decades of controversy that have
followed, it must be admitted that Bell’s recapitulation of the EPR argument in this
paragraph leaves something to be desired. And given the increasing attention that Bell
gave to this very point in his subsequent writings (for example, by later providing more
fully general mathematical formulations of the idea of “locality” and by stressing more
explicitly the precise arguments by which ordinary QM can be seen to violate locality and
by which deterministic hidden variables can be seen to be genuinely required if the perfect
correlations are to be explained locally) it seems that Bell himself would agree that this
important aspect of his 1964 paper could and should have been strengthened.
But let us not lose sight of the big picture here. The EPR argument – and the EPR-ish
argument given by Einstein in the passages surrounding the sentence cited three times by
Bell, including in the very sentence we have just been scrutinizing – were, in the context of
Bell’s 1964 paper, “prior work”. Bell was (rightly or wrongly) taking that prior work
as given, taking its results as already established. And so even in the important first
paragraph of “2 Formulation” we should not understand him as attempting to present a
fully rigorous and detailed version of the argument (“from locality to deterministic hidden
variables”). Instead, I think, we should understand him as giving a quick overview of this
earlier argument, the fuller version of which he invites his readers to find in the Einstein (et
al.) papers (that is, the “Autobiographical Notes” and the EPR paper) which he explicitly
references.
In summary, I think that in 1964 Bell was taking for granted that Einstein et al. had
previously established that determinism was required in order to provide a local account
of the perfect (EPR) correlations. The main new result Bell presented in 1964 was that
this particular method of attempting to restore locality to quantum mechanics could not
succeed, since local deterministic (hidden variable) theories could not reproduce the QM
predictions for a wider class of possible experiments. But to summarize the significance of
Bell’s 1964 paper by saying that he demonstrated a conflict between the QM predictions
4 Indeed, it is not even really clear how one should relate ordinary quantum mechanics (with
realistically-interpreted and collapsing wave functions) to what Bell writes here in words. In ordinary QM,
the orientation of the distant magnet certainly does influence the “real factual situation” (on which much
more later) of the nearby particle; and then the “real factual situation” of that nearby particle certainly
does “influence the result obtained” in the nearby measurement. But, because each of these influences
involves some randomness, it turns out that the nearby measurement outcome is statistically independent
of the distant setting (i.e., it turns out that PI is respected). So, has the distant magnet setting influenced
the nearby result? It is simply not clear.
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and the joint assumptions of “locality” and “determinism” is to simply ignore the crucial
foundational role played by the earlier work of Einstein et al. It is clear that, for Bell,
the significance of his new result was to show that locality simply cannot be maintained if
the quantum predictions are correct: “It is the requirement of locality ... that creates the
essential difficulty.”
4. Discussion
So, whose reading of Bell’s 1964 paper is correct? One important piece of evidence in
support of my reading is simply that it agrees with what Bell himself later says about what
he had been up to in 1964. Of course, such testimony is only reliable to the extent that
there is independent evidence that Bell was an honest reporter about his own earlier work.
But here there is literally universal agreement, among those who knew him and worked
with him, that Bell was an almost uniquely humble, honest, and forthright person who took
extreme care to get details right and to always err on the side of crediting others rather than
himself. I would also submit, as relevant evidence, Bell’s 1977 remarks on “Free variables
and local causality”, which include the following open confession of an earlier mistake
(having nothing directly to do with what’s at issue here): “Here I must concede at once
that the hypothesis becomes quite inadequate when weakened in this way. The theorem
no longer follows. I was mistaken.” [7] Clearly Bell had no difficulty admitting mistakes
when he made them.
Wiseman’s interpretation, which requires one to believe that Bell made a mistake in
1964 and then engaged in a decades-long terminological cover-up campaign, simply does
not seem plausible given what we know about Bell.5 But there are many other and more
direct reasons to reject Wiseman’s interpretation.
First and foremost, Wiseman’s reading requires us to understand Bell to have meant,
5 Wiseman denies that he is “accusing Bell or his followers of intellectual dishonesty”. But for me this is
difficult to reconcile with his description of what must have happened subsequently (under the assumption,
of course, that Wiseman is right about what Bell meant by “locality” in 1964): “once Bell had explicitly
defined [local causality in 1976], he wished all previous localistic notions he had used, in particular the
notion of [Parameter Independence], to be forgotten. Moreover, after a few years he became convinced
that it was the notion of [local causality] that he had in mind all along. [For example], Bell implies in 1981
that both he and Einstein were always using the notion of [local causality], which Bell characterises later
in this 1981 paper in the same way [he had described it] in 1976. As argued [previously] there is only
one plausible reading of ‘locality’ in Bell’s 1964 paper, and it is not [local causality].” Needless to say, I
find it very troubling that, for Wiseman, it is not even plausible to consider that Bell might have meant, by
“locality”, the sort of condition given by Einstein in the passage he referenced, three times, apparently by
way of telling us what he meant by “locality”... and that, by contrast, Wiseman does consider it entirely
plausible (and indeed conclusively established) that Bell in effect lied, successfully, to himself about what
he had meant.
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by “locality”, the condition that would later become known as Parameter Independence.
This, I submit, is completely and utterly implausible. I previously noted that Wiseman’s
interpretation fails to meet all three of the criteria that arise already in the first two sentences
of Bell’s paper. Furthermore, and more even directly, nothing like my Equation (1) –
expressing PI – appears anywhere in Bell’s paper. Nor does Bell say, in words, anything
that can in any direct sense be translated as PI – which, of course, is a statement about
probabilities. All of the statements that Bell makes (in his own voice) about locality in
1964 are statements about “the reading” of an instrument or “the result” of an experiment.
That is, they are statements that can only really be directly translated into mathematics in
the context of specifically deterministic theories. I think that if one really wanted to attempt
to capture, in a mathematical expression, what Bell says in words, it would look like this:
A(a, b, λ) = A(a, λ). (3)
In arriving instead at his mathematical translation, our Equation (1) above, of Bell’s various
words, Wiseman is thus clearly engaging in some pretty creative interpretation.
Recall that Bell makes very clear, by citing Einstein three different times, that his
general notion of locality – as opposed to the specific implication of it that he applies
to deterministic theories – was the notion that Bell understood Einstein to have in mind
when he (Einstein) wrote:
“But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: the
real factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with the
system S1, which is spatially separated from the former.”
Does Wiseman thus mean to suggest that this passage also expresses Parameter
Independence? As noted earlier, Wiseman takes Einstein’s “real factual situation” of
some system to denote “what is probed by measuring it” and takes Einstein’s idea of a
system being “independent” of distant operations as meaning that the distant “action has
no statistical effect”. This strange, vaguely operationalist gloss on Einstein’s words seems
suspicious to me, as if Wiseman is indeed trying to suggest that Einstein, too, should be
interpreted as having meant Parameter Independence. That, of course, would be ridiculous.
But there is also an indication (when he writes that “Bell’s definition of locality follows
from the supposition of Einstein’s which [Bell] quotes”) that in Wiseman’s view Einstein’s
notion of locality is distinct from and more generalized than PI.
But then why would Bell specifically cite this “supposition of Einstein’s” three different
times, in contexts where it is clear that Bell takes the passage to be explicating and
clarifying the concept of “locality”, if Bell actually meant, by “locality”, something distinct
and narrower? Wiseman simply never provides an answer to this crucial question.
It is worthwhile to step back and look also at the passages from Einstein’s
“Autobiographical Notes” that surround the partial sentence quoted by Bell. The
several-pages-long discussion of quantum incompleteness begins as follows:
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“Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought
independently of its being observed. In this sense one speaks of ‘physical
reality.’ In pre-quantum physics there was no doubt as to how this was to be
understood. In Newton’s theory reality was determined by a material point
in space and time; in Maxwell’s theory, by the field in space and time. In
quantum mechanics it is not so easily seen. If one asks: does a ψ-function of
the quantum theory represent a real factual situation in the same sense in which
this is the case of a material system of points or of an electromagnetic field,
one hesitates to reply with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’; why? What the ψ-function
(at a definite time) asserts, is this: What is the probability for finding a definite
physical magnitude q (or p) in a definitely given interval, if I measure it at
time t? The probability is here to be viewed as an empirically determinable,
and therefore certainly as a ‘real’ quantity which I may determine if I create the
same ψ-function very often and perform a q-measurement each time. But what
about the single measured value of q? Did the respective individual system
have this q-value even before the measurement?”
The first sentence already makes perfectly clear that Einstein was not using phrases like
“real factual situation” in the operationalist sense that Wiseman’s interpretation suggests.
And similarly, Einstein’s focus on “the single measured value” and “the individual system”
make it clear that he is not merely interested in the “statistical” type of effect that Wiseman
describes.
It is worth continuing with Einstein’s discussion. Picking up where the previous quote
left off:
“To this question there is no definite answer within the framework of the
[existing] theory, since the measurement is a process which implies a finite
disturbance of the system from the outside; it would therefore be thinkable
that the system obtains a definite numerical value for q (or p) the measured
numerical value, only through the measurement itself. For the further
discussion I shall assume two physicists, A and B, who represent a different
conception with reference to the real situation as described by the ψ-function.
“A. The individual system (before the measurement) has a definite value of
q (i.e., p) for all variables of the system, and more specifically, that value
which is determined by a measurement of this variable. Proceeding from this
conception, he will state: The ψ-function is no exhaustive description of the
real situation of the system but an incomplete description; it expresses only
what we know on the basis of former measurements concerning the system.
“B. The individual system (before the measurement) has no definite value of
q (i.e., p). The value of the measurement only arises in coorperation with the
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unique probability which is given to it in view of the ψ-function only through
the act of measurement itself. Proceeding from this conception he will (or,
at least, he may) state: the ψ-function is an exhaustive description of the real
situation of the system.”
Einstein thus sets up a dilemma between two different views one might take. According to
the “A” view, the distant system already possesses definite, pre-determined values “for all
variables”. We may find out the value of one of these variables by making an appropriate
sort of measurement on the entangled nearby system. But we do not influence or create
those distant values. Of course, the existence of such pre-determined values requires us to
say that the ψ-function fails to provide a complete description of the real physical state of
the distant system.
On the other hand, according to the “B” view, the ψ-function can be claimed to provide
a complete description of the real physical state of the distant system because definite
pre-determined values are no part of that real physical state. But then, as Einstein goes
on to explain, the quantum state ψ2 of the distant system S2 “depends upon what kind of
measurement I undertake on S1”. Continuing:
“Now it appears to me that one may speak of the real factual situation of the
partial system S2. Of this real factual situation, we know to begin with, before
the measurement of S1, even less than we know of a system described by the
[original, pre-measurement] ψ-function. But on one supposition we should,
in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: the real factual situation of the system
S2 is independent of what is done with the system S1, which is spatially
separated from the former. According to the type of measurement which I
make of S1, I get, however, a very different ψ2 for the second partial system
(φ2, φ
1
2, ...). Now, however, the real situation of S2 must be independent of
what happens to S1. For the same real situation of S2 it is possible therefore
to find, according to one’s choice, different types of ψ-function. (One can
escape from this conclusion only by either assuming that the measurement of
S1 ((telepathically)) changes the real situation of S2 or by denying independent
real situations as such to things which are spatially separated from each other.
Both alternatives appear to me entirely unacceptable.)”
What Einstein describes as “unacceptable” is unacceptable precisely in the sense of
violating the notion of locality that he has articulated previously (in the sentence partially
quoted by Bell). So the upshot of Einstein’s discussion – which Einstein goes on to
state in the following paragraph – is that the “B” view described earlier is unacceptable
(i.e., non-local). And that of course leaves only the “A” view, which, remember, involves
attributing definite pre-measurement values “for all variables” associated with the distant
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system. Einstein’s conclusion is, in short, that the only way to avoid an “unacceptable”
kind of nonlocality is to posit local deterministic hidden variables.
I have quoted and summarized this passage from Einstein’s “Autobiographical Notes”
at such length because it allows several crucial points to be made about Bell’s 1964 paper
and Wiseman’s interpretation thereof. I have already noted the complete implausibility
of Wiseman’s operationalistic reading of Einstein. Let us also now consider Wiseman’s
charge that Bell “made a mistake” when he (Bell) summarized Einstein et al. as follows:
“Since we can predict in advance the result of measuring any chosen
component of σ2 by previously measuring the same component of σ1,
it follows that the result of any such measurement must actually be
predetermined.”
Of course, Wiseman’s claim that the argument sketched here is invalid (“a mistake”)
is based on Wiseman’s interpretation that Bell meant, by “locality”, PI. I have already
explained why I find that interpretation implausible.
But how exactly does Wiseman’s accusation relate to Einstein and EPR? As I pointed
out above, it seems (although it is admittedly not completely clear) that Wiseman
recognizes Einstein’s conception of locality (and apparently also that involved in the
EPR argument) as broader than PI. Wiseman also writes that “EPR’s premises ...
are not equivalent to [Parameter Independence] and they do justify the conclusion of
pre-determined outcomes.” So what exactly is the nature of the “mistake” that Wiseman is
accusing Bell of having committed?
Is it that Bell was not attempting to rehearse the earlier EPR argument, but was instead
attempting to replace it with a new (and invalid!) argument involving a narrower concept
of “locality”? Or is it that, although Bell was attempting to rehearse the earlier EPR
argument, he failed to capture it perfectly (in his two-sentence recapitulation) and this
supposed mistake somehow disqualifies that aspect of his paper from consideration? Or
does Wiseman think that, although an EPR-type argument from (something like Einstein’s
generalized notion of) locality, to deterministic hidden variables, can be made rigorous, it
was never made so until he, Wiseman, made it so in his 2014 paper – and that is why
“Bell’s EPR paragraph forms no part of his 1964 theorem”? I see no other available
alternatives, yet none of these are remotely reasonable as justifications for excluding, from
consideration, the EPR part of Bell’s two-part argument.
Wiseman says that Bell’s mistake has “no impact on the main result of his paper.” It
is of course true that the EPR argument is irrelevant to “the main result” if one arbitrarily
stipulates “the main result” to be that the quantum predictions are inconsistent with the
joint assumptions of locality and determinism. But whether or not that is “the main result”
is precisely what is fundamentally at issue in this debate, and it should be clear that the
EPR argument is quite crucial here. If the EPR argument (“from locality to deterministic
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hidden variables”) is valid, then “the main result” of Bell’s 1964 paper is that the quantum
predictions are inconsistent with the single unitary assumption of locality (meaning, of
course, the generalized notion of Einstein/EPR, not PI). And the whole idea that there are
two distinct Bell’s theorems falls apart.
Wiseman’s suggestion that orthodox quantum mechanics is some kind of
“counter-example” to Einstein’s argument (which Bell means to be summarizing) also
underscores the implausibly creative nature of Wiseman’s interpretation. Einstein’s entire
several-page-long discussion (quoted above) is fundamentally about orthodox quantum
mechanics and how it is, and isn’t, possible to understand that theory vis-a-vis locality
and completeness. The idea that Einstein (or Bell) somehow made an argument for locally
pre-determined values, but without bothering to consider the concrete example of orthodox
quantum mechanics, is simply ludicrous. Einstein’s whole argument is embedded in a
discussion of orthodox quantum mechanics from the very beginning.
Later in his paper, Wiseman considers (only to then dismiss it) the possibility that Bell
might have meant, by “locality”, the condition articulated by Einstein in the above-quoted
passage where Einstein speaks of one measurement “telepathically” influencing the other.
Wiseman writes:
“Now although Bell seemed to indicate (twice) [sic] that this [“no telepathy”
condition] was equivalent to his definition of locality, it is different in that it
requires not that Bob’s result B be independent of Alice’s setting a, but rather
that the ‘real factual situation’ of Bob’s system be thus independent.”
Indeed, as Wiseman proceeds to acknowledge, Einstein’s “no telepathy” notion of locality
“has the same force as local causality" and hence would support a valid inference to
deterministic hidden variables.6 But Wiseman dismisses this as irrelevant. As we have
already seen, Wiseman is simply unwilling to believe Bell even when he (Bell) indicates
repeatedly that what he means by “locality” is what Einstein articulates in the essay he
cites. And the existence of a valid argument from Einstein’s “no telepathy” version of
6 Strictly speaking this inference requires the additional assumption “(which ... Einstein makes explicitly)
that systems have real factual situations”. Recall that “denying independent real situations as such to things
which are spatially separated from each other” was one of the two things that Einstein jointly described
as “entirely unacceptable”. In my opinion, and probably that of Einstein, one must clearly accept that
spatially-separated systems have their own “real situations” before one can even meaningfully ask whether
locality is respected. (It is obvious, for example, that Einstein’s formulation of locality – the passage cited
three times by Bell – becomes incoherent if one does not already accept “that systems have real factual
situations.”) The additional required assumption here would thus seem to be a logical precondition for
discussing locality, rather than something one might coherently deny instead of locality. Note that this
point is closely related to the important point that Bell would later express by insisting that the notion of
locality must be formulated “in terms of local beables” [8].
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locality to deterministic hidden variables is also supposedly irrelevant because, according
to Wiseman, Einstein does not “use it there [i.e., in his “Autobiographical Notes”] to make
the argument that Bell wants to make, from predictability to determinism." But, as is plain
from the passages from Einstein’s essay that I have quoted above, this is at best misleading.
Einstein’s discussion in “Autobiographical Notes” does indeed conclude that deterministic
hidden-variables are needed in order to avoid unacceptable non-locality. One can dispute
the rigor with which that conclusion is argued for in that particular discussion,7 but of
course what Bell and all of us now have in mind here is the EPR argument explicitly
involving perfect correlations.
To sum up, Wiseman’s interpretation requires us to believe things about the views of
both Einstein and Bell that are so completely at odds with what is known generally about
these thinkers – and so completely at odds with what they explicitly wrote in the specific
passages in question – that I don’t think it can be taken at all seriously as capturing what
Bell was actually doing in 1964. Wiseman writes, in a footnote, that “there is no evidence
to support the suggestion (Norsen, pers. comm.) that Bell began with a general notion of
locality, along the lines of local causality, and only narrowed it to this definition after he
had established determinism via his EPR paragraph.” I am truly at a loss to understand how
Wiseman could say this, since he himself has reviewed the extensive and overwhelming
evidence: Einstein’s formulation of locality, which Bell repeatedly cites, is precisely a
“general notion of locality, along the lines of local causality”, quite distinct from PI, which
allows a perfectly valid argument “from locality to deterministic hidden variables”, an
argument which Einstein rehearses in the paragraphs immediately surrounding the sentence
that Bell repeatedly cites and which Einstein et al. gave in the EPR paper that Bell also
cites.
Wiseman, as far as I can tell, accepts all of this and yet still somehow believes that
the first paragraph of Bell’s “2 Formulation” is merely “a one-paragraph motivation for
considering hidden variable theories.” I think it is clear that it is more than this. It is the
7 Einstein’s argument in the “Autobiographical Notes” basically takes the following form: either A or B;
not B; therefore A. As I noted earlier, A here includes the idea of deterministic hidden variables. But
as Matt Pusey correctly pointed out during the discussion of this paper in the IJQF “John Bell Workshop
2014”, there are two slightly different sub-versions of B – one the denial of pre-determination, and one
the more specific claim that quantum wave functions provide complete descriptions of physical states. In
the “Autobiographical Notes” Einstein gives a very clear argument, based on locality, against the second
sub-version of B. And of course the EPR paper provides an argument, again based on locality (although
in the EPR text – written by Podolsky – the meaning and role of locality were not made particularly
clear), against the first sub-version of B. So it is probably correct to say that, taking the “Autobiographical
Notes” alone, the argument for pre-determined values contains a kind of gap – but also that, together, the
“Autobiographical Notes” and the original EPR paper jointly contain precisely the argument that “Bell
wants to make”.
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first part of Bell’s overall two-part argument. It’s just that Bell is taking the first part as
earlier work, as a previously-established result that he need not rehearse in rigorous detail,
but may simply refer to and briefly summarize.
This leaves, to my mind, only one question: given that in 1964 Bell presented his new
result as the second part of a two-part argument for the overall conclusion of non-locality
(the first part of which was of course the earlier EPR/Einstein argument), which portion,
exactly, of this two-part argument deserves to be called “Bell’s theorem”?
Here I know from private communication that, when pressed in some of the ways I’ve
tried to lay out above, Wiseman retreats in the direction of saying that, while perhaps Bell
may indeed have had the full two-part argument in mind from the beginning, only the
second part of it (the part that was novel in 1964) deserves the epithet “theorem”. But
this strikes me as a terminological shell-game. If a commentator wants to reserve the
word “theorem” for demonstrations meeting some minimal threshold of rigor (and chooses
to place the threshold somewhere between the level found in Einstein’s two cited papers
and what Bell did after the first paragraph of “2 Formulation” in his 1964 paper) I would
have no objection, so long as the commentator articulates clearly that “Bell’s theorem”,
when combined with the earlier “EPR/Einstein non-theorem” establishing the need for
deterministic hidden variables, leads to the overall conclusion that the QM predictions
are incompatible with locality... and that this is what Bell took himself to have established
already in 1964. I would even have no objection if such a commentator raised questions
about whether this incompatibility was really established in 1964, since (the commentator
might plausibly argue) genuinely establishing such a conclusion requires that all parts of the
argument leading to it meet the commentator’s threshold for theoremhood. What I do object
to, however, is the gross historical mischaracterization that is involved in Wiseman’s almost
complete dismissal of the role of the EPR/Einstein argument (or non-theorem or whatever
one wants to call it) in Bell’s 1964 paper. At the end of the day, and setting terminological
games aside, Wiseman’s account of what Bell did in 1964 is simply inaccurate in that it
fails to capture an essential aspect of what Bell actually established (and took himself to
have established).8
The long-standing disagreements about what Bell did, therefore, cannot simply be
understood as mere miscommunications, based on the existence of two quite distinct
“Bell’s theorems”. The disagreements are instead fundamentally based on the failure –
8 As I pointed out in the IJQF “John Bell Workshop 2014” discussion of Wiseman’s response to this paper,
it is anachronistic to even obsess over what part, exactly, of what Bell did in 1964 ought to be included as
part of “Bell’s Theorem.” There is of course no harm in saying that we are celebrating the 50th anniversary
of “Bell’s Theorem”. But the truth is that we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of Bell’s important 1964
paper. (The very phrase “Bell’s Theorem” is a modern invention, which certainly played no role in Bell’s
thinking circa 1964.)
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of Wiseman’s “operationalists” and also apparently Wiseman himself – to appreciate the
foundational role of the EPR/Einstein argument (“from locality to deterministic hidden
variables”) in Bell’s 1964 paper. Wiseman’s paper may perhaps be doing some good
in so far as his project involves making it more widely known that Bell did eventually
establish a direct conflict between locality (alone) and the quantum predictions. But in
so far as his strategy involves telling the “operationalists” that they were right all along,
in how they understood Bell’s 1964 paper, Wiseman is distorting the historical record,
muddying the waters, and doing a great disservice to Bell on this 50th anniversary of his
great achievement.
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